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Taylor R. Thompson 
 
The United States Circuit Court of the First Circuit’s decision in Town of 
Barnstable v. O’Connor reignites a hotly debated offshore wind plant proposal. 
The First Circuit held that the Ex parte Young exception to the Eleventh 
Amendment applied because the complaint alleged an ongoing violation of 
federal law and the relief sought was prospective. The court did not discuss the 
merits of the claim, so the fight against the proposed wind plant powers on.  
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
In Town of Barnstable v. O’Connor, the Alliance to Protect Nantucket 
Sound, a citizen advocacy group, the Town of Barnstable, and businesses and 
individuals residing near a proposed offshore wind farm (together “Barnstable”) 
challenged the United States District Court of the District of Massachusetts’s 
determination that sovereign immunity barred their claim against the developers 
of the proposed offshore wind farm, and two Massachusetts state agencies 
(together “Defendants”). 1  The district court’s determined that sovereign 
immunity barred Barnstable’s claim against the two agencies, and two private 
actors, Cape Wind and NSTAR, for entering into a Power Purchase Agreement 
(“PPA”), as approved by the Massachusetts Department of Public Utility 
(“DPU”). Barnstable joined two state agency officials in the suit, alleging a 
violation of both the Supremacy Clause and Commerce Clause, which created an 
Eleventh Amendment issue. 2  The Defendants argued that the district court 
properly dismissed the claim based on sovereign immunity.3 The Defendants also 
argued that the basis of the complaint was both moot and unripe, as NSTAR had 
terminated the PPA a week before oral arguments, in the middle of the appeals 
process.4  
The First Circuit held that the Ex parte Young exception to the Eleventh 
Amendment applied to the claim because the proscribed relief was properly 
characterized as prospective, and the complaint properly alleged an ongoing 
violation of federal law.5 The court also held that the issue was not moot and was 
ripe, as the termination of the PPA between NSTAR and Cape Wind remained 
unresolved.6 The court did not decide the merits of the claim, leaving the future 
of the proposed offshore wind facility uncertain.7  
 
 
                                                 
1
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II.  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
Cape Wind has tried to develop off shore wind for years and finally 
made headway in 2008 when the Massachusetts legislature enacted the Green 
Communities Act (“GCA”). 8  The GCA requires energy utilities to solicit 
renewable energy proposals and enter into “cost-effective long-term contracts” 
with renewable energy developers for roughly three percent of their energy 
demand. 9  When enacted, the GCA limited the renewable energy companies 
available to fulfill the requirement in effect solely to in-state companies. 10 
However, in 2010 a Canadian utility company challenged this part of the law, 
which caused an amendment to remove the geographical limitations.11 After the 
geographic ban was lifted, the DPU reopened bidding for out-of-state energy 
generators, and required NSTAR to accept proposals from renewable energy 
companies. 12  NSTAR received bids from forty-four energy developers and 
entered into contracts with three wind developers in 2010, two of which were 
out-of-state.13  
In November 2010, NSTAR sought to merge with Northeast Utilities, a 
Connecticut-based utility company, but needed approval from DPU. 14  After 
negotiations, the parties settled and a subsequent Memorandum of Understanding 
(“MOU”) between NSTAR, DOER, and Cape Wind was approved by DPU, 
requiring NSTAR to purchase 27.5-percent of Cape Wind’s energy output for 
fifteen years. The next day, Cape Wind and NSTAR executed a PPA required by 
the MOU. Once the merger was approved by DPU, the PPA between Cape Wind 
and NSTAR was approved.15  
Barnstable sued, seeking injunctive and declaratory relief, and sought to 
terminate the PPA between Cape Wind and NSTAR.16 Barnstable included the 
agency officials in their official capacity at DPU and the Massachusetts 
Department of Energy Resources (“DOER”) as defendants in the suit. Barnstable 
argued that both agencies violated the Commerce Clause and the Supremacy 
Clause by forcing NSTAR to enter into a PPA with Cape Wind as a condition to 
approve the merger agreement.17 Additionally, Barnstable argued that the PPA 
would create high-energy rates, and that they would suffer “negative impacts to 
the environment, regional economy, historic and cultural resources, public safety, 
and recreational opportunities.”18  
                                                 
8
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The Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint based on sovereign 
immunity, preclusion, lack of ripeness, and failure to state a claim.19 The district 
court sided with the Defendants, determining that the Eleventh Amendment 
barred the court’s jurisdiction to hear the claim, and that the Ex parte Young 
exception did not apply.20 The suit was dismissed with prejudice, and Barnstable 
appealed fourteen months later.21 The First Circuit reviewed de novo.22  
 
III.  ANALYSIS 
 
A. Sovereign Immunity; Ex Parte Young Exception 
 
 The Eleventh Amendment codifies the idea of state sovereign immunity by 
barring a state citizen from bringing a federal claim against his or her own state 
in federal court.  .23 However, the Ex parte Young exception allows federal courts 
to hear claims against a state official in order to ensure that their conduct 
conforms to federal law.24 A critical question in determining whether an Ex parte 
Young exception exists is whether the relief serves to “bring an end to a present 
violation of federal law.”25  
 Relying on the Supreme Court of the United States’s decision in Verizon 
Maryland, Inc. v. Public Service Commission of Maryland, the First Circuit 
recognized that the inquiry of whether the Ex parte Young exception applies does 
not rely on the merits of the claim.26 Rather, the inquiry is “‘straightforward,’” 
and seeks to determine whether the complaint alleges an ongoing violation of 
federal law and seeks prospective relief.27 
The district court determined that the claim would “‘invariably lead to 
restitution claims against the Commonwealth by NSTAR and Cape Wind.””28 
The First Circuit saw this argument as simply conjecture, and an issue which 
could be determined later in a separate action, should it arise.29 The district court 
also held that the relief sought by Barnstable would impact the State’s ability to 
implement policies “‘enunciated in the GCA.’”30 The circuit court determined 
that this alone did not resolve the sovereign immunity issue, because the entire 
point of the Ex parte Young doctrine is to allow a plaintiff to “frustrate the efforts 
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  Id. 
20
  Id. 138 (discussing U.S. Const. amend. XI).  
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  Id.  
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  Id. 
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  Maysonet-Robles v. Cabrero, 323 F.3d 43, 48 (1st Cir. 2003).  
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  O’Connor, 786 F.3d at 138; see Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123.  
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  O’Connor, 786 F.3d at 138 (quoting Whalen v. Mass. Trial Court, 397 F.3d 19, 
29 (1st Cir. 2005)).  
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  Id. at 139 (discussing Verizon Md. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of Md., 535 U.S. 635 
(2002)). 
27
  Id. (quoting Verizon Md., 535 U.S. at 667). 
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  Id. at 140 (quoting Town of Barnstable v. Berwick, 17 F. Supp. 3d 113, 122 (D. 
Mass 2014), rev’d sub nom. O’Connor, 786 F.3d 130).  
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  Id. 
30
  Id. (quoting Berwick, 17 F. Supp. 3d at 123). 
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of a state policy” when the policy threatens or violates the plaintiff’s 
constitutional rights, and the plaintiff requests the proper prospective relief.31  
The Defendants argued that because the DPU had no ongoing role within 
the PPA, there was no longer an “ongoing violation of federal law.”32 The circuit 
court found this argument unpersuasive, as the DPU would annually review 
NSTAR’s recovery of above-market costs to ensure that NSTAR recovers the 
costs “in a manner approved by DPU.”33 The circuit court also used logic to 
extend the Ex parte Young exception to past regulatory orders, holding that most 
state orders occur in the past by the time a lawsuit arises.34 Therefore, the relief 
sought by Barnstable was not retroactive, and the Ex parte Young exception 
applies.35 
 
B. Anticipatory Arguments; Validity of the PPA 
 
Anticipating a possible remand, the Defendants advanced alternative 
arguments supporting dismissal.36 The district court relied solely on the Eleventh 
Amendment barring the claim, and therefore did not address the alternative 
arguments. 37  The circuit court decided to look specifically to the alternative 
arguments advanced by NSTAR on issues of both mootness and ripeness.38 None 
of the parties to the suit agreed on the issues of mootness and ripeness. 
According to NSTAR, the appeal was moot after it terminated the PPA, 
once Cape Wind missed certain financial deadlines.39 However, this argument 
was advanced a week before oral arguments, after the district court had issued its 
order.40 Of course, Cape Wind disagreed with NSTAR’s “termination” of the 
PPA, causing the need for prolonged litigation and confusion.41  
There is a “heavy burden of persuasion” placed upon the party 
advocating mootness to find an issue moot.42 The circuit court’s inquiry into the 
mootness of an issue demands that the intervening events have “completely and 
irrevocably eradicated the effects of the parties’ conduct.” 43  Due to the 
disagreement between Cape Wind and NSTAR over the termination of the PPA, 
the appellate court had no choice but to find that the issue was not moot.44   
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  United States v. Concentrated Phosphate Exp. Ass’n, 393 U.S. 199, 203 (1968).  
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  O’Connor, 786 F.3d at 142. 
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As for the ripeness of the appeal, the circuit court found that the ripeness 
doctrine conferred jurisdiction over the claim to the district court upon remand.45 
The court considered both the claim’s fitness for review and the parties’ 
hardships in order to determine whether the claim was ripe.46 While the circuit 
court concluded that there was “serious potential” for the claim to become 
unripe, the district court had the right to decide questions of law that had not yet 
been decided.47  
 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
  
In determining that the Ex parte Young exception applied to the case, the 
First Circuit emphasized the importance of allowing a plaintiff an opportunity to 
sue their state under limited circumstances. While sovereign immunity remains 
intact, the very limited exception articulated by the court remains a logical way 
for parties to seek relief, despite facing the hurdles of immunity. The future of the 
Defendant’s wind farm remains up in the air, as it faces substantial legal hurdles, 
including a contract dispute with NSTAR. Similarly, Barnstable will also face a 
tough legal battle, as the court gave no indication as to the validity of the claim, 
and signaled that the claim could become moot.48  
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